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CREATING A PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM IN THE SHADOW
OF THE ISRAELI – PALESTINIAN CONFLICT
KENNETH MANN AND DAVID WEINER*
INTRODUCTION
This article discusses the creation of the Israeli Public De-
fender System and its role in representing Palestinians charged with
crimes committed in Israel, including terrorist offenses.  We chose
to write about the creation of the Office of the Public Defender in
Israel (OPD) because it is close to our hearts.  Each of us worked in
the OPD during its formative years and observed it closely since its
establishment in 1996. We believe that the experience of the OPD
yields valuable insights about the role of government in protecting
the value of due process in its judicial system during a period of
intense conflict.
Different societies approach the right to counsel in different
ways, and the task of comparing this particular legal right in diverse
judicial systems is highly problematic.  In Israel, the right to counsel
for indigent defendants in criminal proceedings has not been ex-
tended as far as it has been in the United States.  Although this
seems to imply that there is less due process in the Israeli judicial
system, that conclusion is simplistic because it does not take into
account other distinctive attributes of criminal procedure in Israel.
The question of how different societies protect human dignity and
fairness in their systems of criminal sanctions is beyond the parame-
ters of this article.  Our goal here is limited to showing how one of
those due process rights, the right to counsel, has developed in
Israel.  We will also describe how the OPD, which was invested with
the responsibility of administering that right, has dealt with provid-
ing defense counsel for Palestinians living in the Occupied Territo-
ries.  This task has been difficult because many of these individuals
* Kenneth Mann, Chief Public Defender, State of Israel (1996-2002), Associate
Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, Tel-Aviv University; Partner, Mann & Co., Attorneys-at-
Law, Tel-Aviv. David Weiner, Deputy Chief Public Defender and Director of Supreme
Court Appellate Division, Israeli National Public Defense Organization; Adjunct Lec-
turer of Criminal Procedure and Ethics, Faculty of Law, Bar Ilan University.
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92 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
today see Israel not only as an occupying power, but also as an
enemy.
A government agency providing legal aid in a situation of vio-
lent political confrontation might arguably deny such aid to per-
sons who view the state as an enemy.  In such circumstances,
eligibility for legal aid might be conditioned upon citizenship or
place of residence.  In Israel, no such preconditions have been im-
posed upon legal aid in criminal cases.  Since its establishment, the
OPD has been authorized to provide defense services to suspects
and defendants, regardless of their nationality and place of resi-
dence.  The OPD has provided legal representation to tens of
thousands of Palestinian clients, including Palestinians suspected of
committing ideologically motivated acts of violence.  To date, no
governmental agency or political organization has sought to curtail
the OPD’s mission of representing Palestinian individuals charged
with committing crimes in Israel.  Ironically, the most serious chal-
lenge faced by the OPD emerged in the widely publicized and
highly controversial case of Marwan Barghouti, a Palestinian leader
who denied the court’s legitimacy and refused to accept court or-
dered representation.  Barghouti’s case posed a very special prob-
lem for the OPD because it raised fundamental questions about
due process and the role of public defense in a society enmeshed in
violent conflict.
The Barghouti case does not represent the norm.  In our expe-
rience working for the OPD, defense attorneys working for an of-
fice funded by the Israeli Government have managed to achieve
cooperation with Palestinian clients, including those charged with
terrorist crimes.  Public defenders funded by the State of Israel have
created enclaves of trust, loyalty, and confidentiality with Palestin-
ian clients charged with all types of crimes.  In this article we will try
to give some legal and sociological sense to the island of coopera-
tion that has been sustained in an overwhelmingly hostile political
environment.
This article is comprised of three parts.  The first part provides
historical background by tracing the development of the right to
state-funded defense counsel in Israel.  We describe the impact of
the nascent OPD, which has served as an important vehicle for
change.  The second part of the article addresses the availability of
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state-funded defense counsel for Palestinian defendants from the
West Bank and Gaza.  We highlight the major disparity between the
legal aid available in military courts located in the Occupied Terri-
tories and the civilian criminal courts located within the pre-1967
boundaries of Israel.  We also discuss two recent cases in which the
OPD provided defense counsel for Palestinians charged with partic-
ipation in terrorist actions that caused massive civilian casualties.
The third part of the article discusses the difficult challenge faced
by the OPD in the case of Marwan Barghouti.  We explain how the
OPD dealt with this special challenge, which could have under-
mined the fragile foundations of professional trust built between
the OPD and its clients.
I. THE RIGHT TO STATE-FUNDED DEFENSE COUNSEL IN ISRAEL
A. Historical Background1
The State of Israel inherited its legal system from the British
Government, which administered the area out of which Israel was
created from 1918 until the Declaration of Independence in 1948.
Shortly thereafter, the interim government declared that almost all
of the British legal system would continue to apply to the new
state’s governmental structure.2  There was no time to create all of
the many government institutions anew.  There were also serious
divisions within the political community of the new state, resulting
in the decision to postpone the task of adopting an original consti-
tution that would set out government powers and individual rights.
The Israeli Declaration of Independence did contain a statement of
1. See generally, Daniel Friedman, The Effect of Foreign Law on the Law of Israel:
Remnants of the Ottoman Period, 10 ISR. L. REV. 192 (1975); Daniel Friedman, Infusion of
the Common Law into the Legal System of Israel, 10 ISR. L. REV. 324 (1975); Daniel
Friedman, Independent Development of Israeli Law, 10 ISR. L. REV. 515 (1975); Yoram
Shachar, History and Sources of Israeli Law, in INTRODUCTION TO THE LAWS OF ISRAEL 1-10
(Amos Shapira & Keren C. DeWitt-Arar eds., 1995).  For the institutional organization
of the Israeli legal system and its constitutional history, see Ruth Gavison, Forty Years of
Israeli Law: Constitutional Law, 24 ISR. L. REV. 431 (1990); David Krestzmer, Constitutional
Law, in INTRODUCTION TO THE LAWS OF ISRAEL, 39-58 (Amos Shapira & Keren C. DeWitt-
Arar eds., 1995); Asher Maoz, The Institutional Organization of the Israeli Legal System, in
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAWS OF ISRAEL 11-38 (Amos Shapira & Keren C. DeWitt-Arar
eds., 1995); Asher Maoz, Constitutional Law, in THE LAW OF ISRAEL: GENERAL SURVEYS 3
(I. Zamir & S. Colombo eds., 1995).
2. See Law and Administration Ordinace, 1948, 1 L.S.I. 7.
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the new state’s aspirations and fundamental values.3  However, in-
stead of creating a binding legal source in a comprehensive consti-
tution, the legislature undertook to make special legislative
arrangements for matters of governmental institutional capacity,
such as the powers of the legislature, cabinet ministers, president
and judiciary.4  These laws, whose constitutional status is still not
completely developed, are called “Basic Laws.”5  The Supreme
Court of Israel has interpreted three of these basic laws as giving
the Court the right to overturn contradictory regular laws, thus
granting it the power of judicial review.6
3. See Israeli Declaration of Independence § 11, 1948 1 L.S.I. 3 (1947-48) (“The
State of Israel will be open for Jewish immigration and for the gathering of the Exiles; It
will foster the development of the country for the benefit of all its inhabitants; it will be
based on freedom, justice and peace as envisaged by the prophets of Israel; It will en-
sure complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of
religion, race or sex; it will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language, educa-
tion and culture; it will safeguard the Holy Places of all religions; and it will be faithful
to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.”).
4. See H.C. 7/48 Al Karbutally v. Minister of Defence 2 P.D. 5, 12; H.C. 10/48,
Zeev v. Gubernik, 1 P.D. 85 (translated in 1 Selected Judgements Sup. Ct. Isr. 68, 70
(1948)).
5. The Basic Laws that were enacted to date are: Basic Law: The Knesset, 1958,
12 L.S.I. 85 (1957-58); Basic Law: Israel Lands, 1960, 14 L.S.I. 48 (1959-60); Basic Law:
The President of the State, 1964, 18 L.S.I. 111 (1963-64); Basic Law: The State Econ-
omy, 1975, 29 L.S.I. 273 (1974-75); Basic Law: The Army, 1976, 30 L.S.I. 150 (1975-76);
Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel, 1980, 34 L.S.I. 209 (1979-80); Basic Law: Judici-
ary, 1984, 38 L.S.I. 101 (1983-84); Basic Law: The Comptroller, 1988, 1237 S.H. 30 (He-
brew); Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, 1994, 1454 S.H. 90 (Hebrew); Basic Law:
Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, 1391 S.H. 150 (Hebrew) (English version available
in 33 ISR. L. REV. 718 (1999)); Basic Law: Government, 2001, 1780 S.H. 158.
6. These Basic Laws are:  Basic Law: The Knesset, 1958, 12 L.S.I 85; Basic Law:
Freedom of Occupation, 1992, 1454  S.H. 90 (Hebrew); Basic Law: Human Dignity and
Liberty, 1992, 1391 S.H. 150 (Hebrew) (English version available in 33 ISR. L. REV. 718
(1999)).  For cases in which the Israeli Supreme Court acknowledged its power of judi-
cial review of legislation, see generally H.C. 98/69, Bergman v. Minister of Finance, 23
P.D.(I) 693, abriged in 4 ISR. L. REV. 577 (1969); C.A. 6821/93, United Mizrachi Bank
plc v. Migdal Cooperative Village, 49(4) P.D. 22 (1995), abridged in 31 ISR. L. REV. 764
(a full translation of the opinion of Chief Justice Barak in this case also appears in
TOWARDS A NEW EUROPEAN IUS EOMMUNE- ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN, ITALIAN AND ISRAELI
LAW 381-539 (A. Gambaro & A.M. Rabello eds., 1999)). See also H.C. 6055/95 Tzemach
v. Minister of Defence, 53(5) P.D. 241.
For a discussion of the enactment of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty
and its implications, see infra.  For a discussion of judicial review before the enactment
of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, see David Kretzmer, Judicial Review of Knesset
Decisions, 8 TEL AVIV U. STUD. L. 95 (1988); Amos Shapira, Judicial Review without a
Constitution: The Israeli Paradox, 56 TEMP. L. Q. 405 (1983).
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For the foregoing reasons, criminal procedural law in Israel
during the first years of statehood was British in content, with some
important exceptions.7  In criminal as well as civil trials there are no
juries.  Instead, professional judges issue reasoned findings of facts.
The legislated system of criminal procedure is, however, an adver-
sary system, similar to the British and American systems.  The legal
presumption of innocence has been adopted; proof beyond reason-
able doubt is required for criminal convictions;8 and cross-examina-
tion of witnesses holds a central place in the trial process. Although
these characteristics have remained part of the fundamental legis-
lated structure of criminal procedure, the system has been equally
shaped by practices in courts, some of which go against the grain of
the adversary system,9 such as proactive questioning of witnesses by
judges.
The en bloc reception of British legal principles under Israeli
law has meant that the right to representation in criminal trials was
a legislative right, not a constitutional right.  There are two princi-
ple legislative rules.  First, a defendant in a criminal case has the
right to be represented by private counsel of his or her choice at
any stage of a criminal proceeding.10  Second, certain limited clas-
ses of  defendants have the right to be represented at trial by a
“state appointed” defense counsel.11  During the Mandate period
the right to appointed counsel attached only to crimes for which
the death penalty could be imposed.  In the mid-sixties, this right
was broadened to include mandatory appointment of counsel for
defendants charged with crimes bearing a potential maximum
7. See Kenneth Mann, Criminal Procedure, in INTRODUCTION TO THE LAWS OF
ISRAEL, supra note 1, at 267; Eliahu Harnon, Criminal Procedure and Evidence, 24 ISR. L.
REV. 592 (1990).
8. Section 34 (Kaf-Bet) of the preliminary part of the penal law states: “One shall
not bear criminal responsibility for an offence unless it is proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.” An English version of the preliminary part was published in 30 ISR. L. REV. 5
(1996).
9. See Mann, supra note 7, at 267-268.
10. This right arises from Section 22 of the Chambers of Advocates, 1961, 15 L.S.I
74 (1960-61), which states “a person who grants a power-of-attorney to an attorney is
entitled to be represented by that attorney before all organs of the State . . . .”
11. See The Criminal Procedure Law [Consolidated Version], § 15(a), 1982, 36
L.S.I 35 (1981-82).
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prison sentence of ten years or more.12  There was no legislated
right to appointed counsel for most defendants charged with lesser
crimes or defendants appearing at pretrial bail hearings or postrial
appellate proceedings.  However, judges were invested with a dis-
cretionary authority to appoint counsel.  Over the years, judges
moderately increased their use of this power.  As a result, some sus-
pects and defendants were represented by state-funded counsel in
cases for which there was no mandatory appointment.
At the beginning of the 1990’s, it was evident that many defen-
dants were still unrepresented in criminal trials in Israel.  The per-
12. The earliest mandatory law controlling the right to counsel was the Poor Pris-
oners Defense Ordinance, 1926. See Courts Ordinance, 1924, Laws of Palestine (1818-
1925), Vol. I, 199, Official Gazette, August 1, 1926).  This Ordinance granted discretion
to the President of the Court of Criminal Assize to certify that a certain defendant
ought to have legal aid. This applied primarily to offenses carrying a potential penalty
of death.  Like most other British legislation, the Poor Prisoners Defense Ordinance
remained in force after the establishment of the state of Israel.  It was only abolished
with the enactment of the Criminal Procedure Law, 1965, 19 L.S.I 158 (1965-66), which
broadened the right to counsel substantially.  The amendment of 1965 established a
duty to appoint counsel (as opposed to a discretionary power to do so) with regard to
three categories of defendants: defendants who are charged with an offence punishable
by imprisonment for ten years or more; defendants under sixteen years of age who are
brought before a court other than a Juvenile Court; and dumb, blind, or deaf defen-
dants.  The mandatory appointment applied to any such defendant who was unrepre-
sented, regardless of indigence.  In addition, the new statute granted full discretion to
any court to appoint a defense attorney to destitute defendants and to defendants who
are suspected of being mentally ill.  The next expansion of the right to counsel ap-
peared in the Youth Law (Trial, Punishment, and Modes of Treatment), 1971, 25 L.S.I.
128 (1970-71).  This law, which established the Juvenile Court system, also established
that the court “is authorized to appoint a defense counsel to a minor, if it thinks that
the benefit of the minor requires it.”  The next expansion of the right to counsel came
in 1974, in the context of an amendment to the law of criminal procedure.  Criminal
Procedure (Amendment No. 4) Law, 1974, 29 L.S.I 8 (1973-74) was the first piece of
legislation to grant power to appoint counsel in pre-trial and bail proceedings.  In 1981,
in the context of another amendment to the law of criminal procedure, the right to
counsel was expanded to include suspects and defendants in special pretrial proceed-
ings for the preservation of testimonial evidence, and defendants “suspected of being
intellectually deficient.” See Criminal Procedure (Amendment No. 15) Law, 1981, 35
L.S.I 224 (1981-82).  In 1988, the law of criminal procedure was amended once again,
and judges were required to appoint defense counsel in bail hearings in which the
prosecution moves to deny bail for the entire duration of a criminal trial. See Criminal
Procedure (Amendment No. 9) Law, 1988, 1261 S.H. 184 (1987-88).  For a comprehen-
sive survey of the historical development of the right to counsel in Israel, see Yitzhak
Sapir, The Rise (and Fall) of Public Defense in Israel: Legitimation, Institutionalization,
and Deradicalization (unpublished S.J.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with
author).
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centage of defendants not represented was not known with any
degree of certainty because no data was kept and no research ex-
isted on the topic.  At that time, the state was only required to fund
defense counsel for persons charged with a crime that carried a
maximum prison term of ten years or more, or where judges used
their discretionary power of appointment.  Because the vast major-
ity of criminal cases brought to court bore potential prison
sentences of less than ten years, the main way that indigent defen-
dants could get counsel was through judicial appointment.  The
problem was that judges were hesitant to use this power to provide
representation for the large numbers of indigent defendants ap-
pearing in court without attorneys.  This was the result of three fac-
tors: a tradition in the courts of hearing cases without counsel,
inadequate funding in the court’s budget for appointed counsel,
and a relative scarcity of competent counsel willing to take appoint-
ments from the court within the very low fee schedule set for remu-
nerating appointed counsel.13
B. The Creation of a Public Defense System in Israel
The precursors of reform emerged in the early 1980’s.  Follow-
ing several critical media reports on the low quality of legal aid at-
torneys, the Minister of Justice appointed a Study Commission to
examine the problem of legal aid in criminal cases and to make
recommendations.14  The Ministry commissioned empirical re-
search on legal aid in Israel, requesting information on the nature
of legal aid in Europe and North America.  The empirical study
showed that judges in Israel were dissatisfied with the competence
of court-appointed attorneys.15  The study revealed that Israel was at
the bottom of the list of countries surveyed for per-capita expendi-
ture on legal aid for criminal defendants. The Commission also in-
dicated dissatisfaction with the low likelihood of getting appointed
13. See Report of the Commission for Investigating the Issue of Legal Aid in Criminal Pro-
ceedings (Jerusalem 1985) (Hebrew) (“The Bechor Report”).
14. See id.  The chairman of the commission was Supreme Court Judge David
Bechor and it is known as “The Bechor Commission.”
15. Eliahu Harnon, Legal Aid in Criminal Proceedings – Theory and Practice in
Comparative Perspective (The Harry Sacher Institute for Legislative Research and Com-
parative Law, Jerusalem, 1983) (Hebrew).
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counsel if the case did not fall within the rule of mandatory
appointment.
Despite opposition from the Israeli Bar Association, the Com-
mission recommended the establishment of a national public de-
fender system, along the lines of the public defender programs
found widely in the United States.16  In addition, the Commission
recommended expansion of the population of defendants entitled
to publicly funded defense attorneys in criminal trials.  Shortly after
the Commission published its report, the Institute of Criminal Law
at Tel-Aviv University published empirical data on the actual rate of
non-representation in criminal trials in Israel.17  Many in the legal
community who did not practice criminal law refused to believe
that over half of the criminal defendants were tried without coun-
sel.  The report gained public attention and emphasized the serious
effects flowing from lack of representation in criminal trials.
The legislature also contributed to the expansion of the right
to representation by enacting “Basic Law: Human Dignity and Lib-
erty” in 1992.18  This Basic law sought to provide better protection
to the individual from arbitrary and unreasonable actions by the
state.  It contained a declaration of principle and enumerated cer-
tain rights that were aimed directly at protecting due process in
criminal proceedings.  The Basic Law stipulated that individuals
could not be detained or imprisoned unless such actions bore “a
reasonable and proportionate relationship to a justified goal.”  This
Basic Law served as a source for legal norms and new applications
of procedural due process,19 which advocates have used to press the
courts to expand the right to counsel.
16. The Bechor Report, supra note 14, at 15.
17. Kenneth Mann, Report on Criminal Defendents and their Representation by Lawyers
(Jerusalem Institute for the Research of Israel, 1983) (Hebrew).
18. 1391 S.H. 150 (Hebrew). The English version appears in 33 ISR. L.REV. 718
(1999).
19. This formulation of substantive due process became a rich source for judicial
review of administrative action and eventually, as a source for judicial review of legisla-
tion.  The enactment of this Basic Law and Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation was
considered by many, including Supreme Court Chief Justice Aharon Barak, as a “consti-
tutional revolution”.  See his opinion in United Mizrachi Bank plc v. Migdal Cooperative
village case, supra note 6. See also Aharon Barak, The Constitutionalization of the Israeli
Legal System as a Result of the Basic Laws and its Effect on Procedural and Substantive Criminal
Law, 31 ISR. L. REV. 3 (1997). But see Ruth Gavison, A Constitutional Revolution?, in
TOWARDS A NEW EUROPEAN IUS COMMUNE-ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN, ITALIAN AND ISRAELI LAW
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The Supreme Court sent a message to the larger legal commu-
nity about the inadequacy of legal aid in a landmark criminal ap-
peal in the late 1980’s.  In State v. Abargil,20 a trial court rejected
appointment of counsel for a defendant in a burglary prosecution
after the defendant had pled not guilty.  When the government
presented its witnesses, the defendant refused to conduct any cross-
examination.  On appeal, the Supreme Court criticized the lower
court’s decision not to appoint counsel, but also understood the
court’s decision as a reflection of the lack of adequate legal services
for indigent criminal defendants.  In its concluding remarks, two of
the judges called for the establishment of a new criminal legal aid
system.21
A final factor was a law reform initiative that originated in the
Faculty of Law at Tel-Aviv University. In 1990, the Faculty estab-
lished a clinical program to train attorneys in criminal defense and
provide legal aid to indigent defendants.  In the context of the
clinic, staff and students represented many defendants who would
otherwise not have had counsel.  The students conducted research
on the needs of indigent defendants, paying special attention to the
517 (A. Gambaro & A.M. Rabello eds., 1999); Ruth Gavison, Role of Courts in Rifted De-
mocracies, 33 ISR. L. REV. 219 (1999); Michael Mandel, Democracy and the New Constitution-
alisation in Israel, 33 ISR. L. REV. 259 (1999).
See Aharon Barak, The Constitutionalization of the Israeli Legal System as a Result of the
Basic Laws and its Effect on Procedural and Substative Criminal Law, 31 ISR. L. REV. 3 (1997);
Eliahu Harnon, The Impact of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty on the Law of
Criminal Procedure and Evidence, 33 ISR. L. REV. 678 (1999).
20. C.A. 134/89, Abargil v. State of Israel, 44(4) P.D. 203 (Hebrew). For a critical
view of that decision see: Note, The Israeli Gideon?, 26 ISR. L. REV. 373 (1992)
21. In the early Nineties, in another important case, this one involving a defen-
dant’s detention before conviction, the Supreme Court declared that it was setting out
as one of its agendas an enhanced recognition of defendant’s rights in criminal cases.
Here the President of the Supreme Court relied on the Basic Law: Human Dignity and
Liberty as the source of its decision limiting the authority of the state to detain defen-
dants during their criminal trials.  The President of the Supreme Court said that sus-
pects and defendants in criminal cases would be entitled to more “due process” than
they had enjoyed up until that time in the criminal justice system.  This declaration was
received in the legal community as a kind of road marker to a new era in which crimi-
nal law and procedure would come under greater scrutiny. Many expected that there
would be a “constitutionalization” of criminal procedure. This declaration of intent
seems to have had an impact on the readiness of legislators and government civil ser-
vants to increase funding of legal aid in order to establish the public defender organiza-
tion. See H.C. 2316/95, Ganimat v. State of Israel, 49(1) P.D. 589, abridged in 31 ISR.
L. REV.754 (1997). Cf. Barak, supra note 19.
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question of how institutionally to provide more representation in
the criminal courts. The staff of the clinic viewed the law reform
program in the clinic as a prototype of a public defender office.  A
critical turning point in the efforts to establish a public defender
system occurred when the faculty and students in the clinic drafted
the text of a law designed to establish a nationwide public defender
system.
The proposed law envisioned an independent government of-
fice, with a chief public defender in a position parallel to the chief
state prosecutor, and in-house as well as privately contracted attor-
neys, who would provide legal aid in all criminal cases in which the
suspects and defendants would be eligible.  Special emphasis was
put on the creation of supervisory staff that would both train attor-
neys and monitor the quality of defense services provided.  The pro-
posal also called for an expansion of the right to appointed
counsel.
After a lengthy legislative process, the Knesset passed compre-
hensive legislation in 1995, establishing the OPD and expanding
the right to counsel in criminal cases.22  The law passed by the
Knesset, based on the draft proposed by the Tel Aviv law faculty
legal clinic, set a timetable of three years for the establishment of
the OPD throughout the country.  The law vested the OPD with the
responsibility of ensuring effective assistance of counsel for all sus-
pects and defendants who were entitled to legal aid.
The first local office of the OPD opened in Tel-Aviv in 1996,
with a staff of three attorneys and two administrators.  Private attor-
neys were chosen by interview and during the first year, they han-
dled almost all of the cases, including mandatory and discretionary
appointments of counsel.  As the OPD achieved success in its first
district office, eligibility was expanded, the staff and budget was in-
creased, and training and supervision became professionalized.  By
the year 2000, the entire system had been established.  There were
five district offices of the OPD covering all criminal courts in Israel.
The in-house staff had grown to 75 staff attorneys and 120 adminis-
22. The Public Defender Law, 1995, 1551 S.H. 8. The new law expanded the right
of public defense to indigent defendants charged with crimes carrying a maximum
prison term of five years or more. Art. 18 of the law also extended the right of a publicly
funded defense counsel to indigent detainees at bail hearings.
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trators.  State expenditure for criminal legal aid had grown over ten
fold and approximately 700 private bar attorneys were on contract
to provide representation. The Minister of Justice called the OPD a
“legal empire.”  Activists in the Bar Association of Israel complained
that the Public Defender was taking over the entire market of crimi-
nal defense. The Supreme Court granted the OPD the status of ami-
cus curiae,23 recognizing for the first time the very idea of amicus
standing in Israeli law, while giving the OPD an important repre-
sentative role before the Supreme Court.24
With the establishment of the OPD, there was a significant ex-
pansion of the class of defendants who were provided attorneys,
and the quality of legal representation improved.  In the past, sus-
pects in bail hearings were represented only rarely; by 2000, almost
all were represented. The percentage of unrepresented defendants
in criminal trials went down significantly as well.  In the past, most
minors in juvenile court were not represented by counsel; now,
most were represented by public defenders.25  The level of practice
and competence of attorneys went up sharply due primarily to the
attorney selection policy and the supervision by staff attorneys.  This
23. R.T. 7929/96, Kusli v. State of Israel 53(1) P.D. 529, 553-54 (Hebrew).
24. Several issues that were discussed in this legislative preparation period had a
substantial impact on the institutional integrity of the office of the public defender, and
in turn, on the ability of the office to provide legal counsel without interference from
the government or its agencies.  The first was whether its chief personnel would be
given civil service ranks equivalent to those in parallel positions in the state prosecutor’s
office.  Eventually the decision was taken to grant the chief public defender the same
rank as the chief state prosecutor.  The second was the question of the relationship of
the chief public defender to the attorney general.  The attorney general supervises and
has the power to override decisions made by the chief state prosecutor, as well as all
executive decisions by ministers and their staffs in respect all questions of legal rights
and obligations arising in the administration of government.  If this principle were to
be applied to the chief public defender, then the attorney general, who ultimately di-
rects the public prosecution, would also direct the public defender.  This arrangement
was found be unsuitable for the mission of the public defender.  It was thus decided
that the public defender would be entirely independent in making decisions about how
to handle its cases.  The attorney general would not be able to override a decision made
by public defender as to how to defend clients.  The attorney general would also not be
able to intervene in the public defender’s decision to represent a person who was enti-
tled to representation under the public defender law.
25. Shortly after the establishment of the OPD the legislature extended the right
to a public defender to any minor who is arrested or indicted for a crime. See Public
Defender Regulations (Representation of Additional Defendants), 1998, 5917 K.T.
1096 (Hebrew).
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was the first time that any attorney handling a legal aid case had to
submit written reports on his or her activities, consult with supervi-
sors, and get express permission to take certain steps in cases.
As the activities of the office of the OPD gained momentum,
the caseload grew rapidly. Under the old system of legal aid, two to
three thousand defendants were represented each year. By the
third year of the OPD’s operation, after district defender offices
with full time staff members were opened in Tel-Aviv, Jerusalem,
Nazareth, Haifa, and Beersheva, public defenders represented
twenty thousand defendants in criminal cases and ten thousand sus-
pects in bail hearings annually.
Different strands of professional and political support had
joined forces to rectify a widely recognized problem and to bring
about significant reform in indigent criminal defense. The key to
this transformation was twofold.  First, an independent organiza-
tion was created, staffed by attorneys committed ideologically to the
notion of due process and the right to representation.  Second, the
salaries, fees, and status of the staff attorneys were established and
guaranteed by law.  What had been a lose amalgamation of lonely
and under-motivated attorneys in the pre-OPD period had become,
in the new organizational setting, a group of highly interacting at-
torneys who found professional support and moral energy in their
commitment to the idea of public defense.
Success, however, is not the full story.  Although the Public De-
fender Law brought significant changes, in 2004, four out of ten
defendants in criminal cases remain unrepresented in some of the
non-metropolitan lower trial courts.26  The Israeli Supreme Court
still denies appeals lodged by indigent defendants whose main
claim for overturning a conviction is lack of representation at
trial.27  The OPD currently faces severe budgetary pressures, which
have led to the reduction of fees for public defenders.  There have
also been several legislative efforts, albeit unsuccessful, to scale back
the number of defendants entitled to representation.
26. See Kenneth Mann, Research: The Scope of Representation of Defendants in Criminal
Proceedings, 58 HASANEGOR 3 (2002) (Hebrew).
27. C.A. 2469/00, Perets v. State of Israel Dinim Mehozi, 32(9) 898 (Hebrew)
(denying a request for permission to appeal). See Yitzhak Zamir, Human Rights and Na-
tional Security, 23 ISR. L. REV. 375 (1989).
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II. STATE - FUNDED REPRESENTATION OF PALESTINIANS
IN ISRAELI COURTS
A. Criminal Prosecutions of Palestinians and the Role of the OPD
Thousands of Palestinians residing in the West Bank and Gaza
are prosecuted each year in Israeli courts.  The charges leveled
against Palestinians in Israeli courts run the entire gambit of crimi-
nal offenses, including among others, murder, burglary, assault,
drug and sex offenses.  Regulatory offenses relating to illegal pres-
ence in Israel and offenses against state security are the two main
categories of offenses that relate to Palestinian residents in the Oc-
cupied Territories.
Israeli law enforcement authorities administer a complex set of
regulations to identify Palestinians and restrict their presence in
Israel.28  Palestinian residents of the West Bank and Gaza are not
allowed to enter Israel unless they fall within a category of persons
for whom entry permits are issued.29  The entry permits generally
forbid the person from staying overnight in Israel.  Many Palestini-
ans violate these provisions and commit regulatory offenses, such as
the use of false identity documents and illegal presence in Israel.
Most of the widespread violations stem from simple disregard of
regulations or from economic motivations, not security offenses.
Many Palestinians who do not hold permits attempt to enter Israel
for days or weeks at a time, in order to work as laborers in Israeli
businesses.  Such regulatory violations are widespread.  When dis-
covered, most of these persons are simply returned to the Territo-
ries.  Repeat violators are arrested and charged, and some may
receive a prison sentence for up to one year.  A significant propor-
tion of the defendants represented by the OPD are Palestinians
charged with regulatory violations.
28. The issue of legal status of the West Bank and Gaza strip is very complicated
and unclear. The existing law is a combination of the Pre-1967 Jordanian law, Israeli
Regulations for Protection During Emergency Times and ordinances of the military
commander of the area. See Moshe Drori, Legal system in Judea and Samaria: a review of the
previous decade with a glance at the future, 8 ISR. YEARBOOK ON HUM. RTS. 144 (1978).  For a
more recent review, see Yoram Dinstein, International Legal Status of the West Bank and
Gaza Strip – 1998, 28 ISR. YEARBOOK ON HUM. RTS. 37 (1998).
29. During the present (second) Intifada, entry permits occasionally are cut off
completely.  At other times, permits are issued to ten to twenty thousand workers whose
security backgrounds are adequate for issuance of an entry permit.
18178_nlr_48-1-2 Sheet No. 55 Side B      04/27/2004   12:08:32
18178_nlr_48-1-2 Sheet No. 55 Side B      04/27/2004   12:08:32
C M
Y K
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\48-1-2\NLR214.txt unknown Seq: 14 16-APR-04 9:30
104 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
Crime against state security is the other type of offense that
relates predominantly to Palestinians represented by the OPD.
These offenses include ideologically motivated attacks against civil-
ians and soldiers, ranging from juveniles throwing rocks at a pass-
ing vehicle, to terrorists carrying out suicide bombings in crowded
restaurants.  Israeli institutions and Israeli citizens have coped with
security offenses since the establishment of the state.  Offenses
against state security are committed by individuals acting alone and
by groups of persons supported by complex organizational struc-
tures.  Perpetrators use a wide variety of weapons, including rocks
of different sizes, Molotov cocktails, handguns, rifles, bombs, and
rockets to assault, kidnap, and kill individuals.  Human targets are
sometimes soldiers, sometimes unarmed civilians.  Property may
also be targeted, for example, in cases of houses destroyed by arson.
Security offenses are committed by children acting spontaneously,
as well as by suicide bombers who are recruited, trained, video-
taped in a declaration of their mission, and delivered to a site
through a network of cell members.
Before the creation of the OPD, Palestinian suspects and de-
fendants who were charged with crimes other than state security
offenses would generally be unrepresented at pretrial bail hearings
and at trial.  The absence of representation did not result from a
special rule applied to Palestinians; it reflected the general rule in
the criminal courts that most indigent persons were not repre-
sented.  As indicated, judges tended not to appoint counsel for un-
represented defendants when there was no mandatory rule of
representation.  In the serious cases, including offenses against
state security, court-appointed attorneys would often represent de-
fendants.  Some of the attorneys who handled these cases, particu-
larly the Jewish attorneys, were identified with the political left.
Because of the low fees paid and the political identification of attor-
neys in these cases with a certain type of political ideology, many
defense attorneys refused to be involved.  Although there were a
handful of highly skilled and committed attorneys, the level of rep-
resentation for Palestinian defendants charged with serious crimes
was not satisfactory.  A dominant theme during this period was ab-
sence of representation in the less serious cases and substandard
representation in the more serious cases.  The available attorney
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pool, including Arabs and Jews, was very small.  It included perhaps
two-dozen attorneys out of the twenty thousand members of the
bar.  Once established, the OPD would change much of this, not
because it was established to deal with Palestinians or security of-
fenses in particular, but because it sought to enlarge the right to
representation and raise the quality of representation throughout
the criminal justice system.  Cases involving Palestinian defendants
were “caught-up” in the wave of basic criminal justice reforms that
the OPD sought to institute and institutionalize throughout the
court system.
The leadership of the OPD believed it was important to have
Arab attorneys on staff as a statement of its commitment to a multi-
cultural environment and affirmative action in hiring.  Arab citizens
are significantly underrepresented on the staffs of most governmen-
tal agencies in Israel, including the various branches of the Ministry
of Justice. This situation reflects underlying social problems in Is-
raeli society, including barriers raised by civil service employment
processes to Arab applicants and distrust of government in the Is-
raeli Arab community.  The former constitutes an external barrier
to entry, the latter an internal subjective resistance to identifying
with the authority of the Israeli government.  The leadership of the
OPD believed it was important to stand out as an exception to the
general rule of under-representation in agencies funded by the gov-
ernment.  The OPD had a clear advantage in pursuing this goal; for
potential Arab recruits, applying to an organization dedicated to
helping individuals prosecuted by officers of the state removed
much of the stigma attached to taking a civil service job.30
The chief administrators of the OPD believed that it was sym-
bolically important to have Arab attorneys in large proportion rep-
resenting Arab defendants in the criminal courts.  Because very few
Jewish attorneys speak Arabic fluently, it was clear that bringing
Arab attorneys onto the staff could increase the standard of legal
services.  Under OPD policy, Jewish attorneys would also be as-
signed to represent Arab defendants and Arab attorneys would be
30. At present, seven years after the creation of the OPD, approximately 15% of
the staff attorneys are Arabs, and 30% of the contract attorneys are Arabs.  Arabs consti-
tute approximately 18% of the population of Israel, excluding the Occupied
Territories.
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assigned to represent Jewish defendants.  In spite of this policy,
however, there was a natural pull toward assigning Arab attorneys to
Arabs and Jewish attorneys to Jews. It was unclear whether the com-
bination of Arab and Jew in the attorney-client relationship would
undermine client confidence in the attorney or frustrate adequate
representation because of language and cultural barriers.  A bal-
ance had to be struck between the commitment to multiculturalism
and the best interests of the client.
B. Civilian and Military Prosecutions for Offenses
against State Security
The manner in which Israeli police and military authorities re-
spond to security offenses varies widely.  Palestinians taken into cus-
tody on suspicion of committing an offense against state security
are subject to one of two different institutional legal processes.
One is a military system where the nature of the legal process is
determined by laws issued by the military authorities in the Occu-
pied Territories.  The other is a civilian system where the nature of
the legal process is determined by the general state law applicable
to all criminal offenses, with special provisions for security of-
fenses.31  A security suspect taken into custody by the army for an
offense allegedly committed in the Occupied Territories is most
likely to be brought before a military court.  He may, however, be
put into the civilian system, requiring a transfer to civilian police
custody.  A suspect charged with committing a security offense
within the pre-1967 boundaries of the State of Israel is most likely to
be tried in the regular criminal courts.  In the military courts, most
of which sit in the Occupied Territories, the legal procedures em-
ployed are similar to those used in the civilian courts. Judges pre-
side over an adversary system. Suspects and defendants have the
right to be represented by counsel, including counsel appointed by
the court.  There is a presumption of innocence and procedural
rules limit the admissibility of hearsay evidence.
31. For a discussion of the military courts in the occupied territories, and their
specific rules of jurisdiction and procedure, see Emanuel Gross, Trying Terrorists – Justifi-
cation for Differing Trial Rules: The Balance Between Security Considerations and Human
Rights, 13 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 1-97 (2002).
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There are important differences, however.  For instance, in the
military system suspects can be held in custody for extended peri-
ods before procedural rules compel the state to bring the suspect
before a judicial officer.  Under military rules, the security suspect
may be held in custody following initial and periodic judicial re-
views, but without a full trial.  Detention without trial can last for
months and sometimes for years.  Another distinctive characteristic
of the military judicial system is the frequent use of administrative
detention.  While there is a separate statute in the civilian legal sys-
tem providing for the administrative detention of Israeli citizens, it
is used very infrequently.  Military administrative detention is used
in two distinctive situations.  The first is when intelligence informa-
tion indicates that the detained person is likely to commit a serious
security offense in the future.  Here, detention is used as a preven-
tive measure only, as there is no completed offense that would pro-
vide the basis for a trial.  The second is when the evidence against a
security suspect cannot be produced at trial without exposing an
important intelligence source or without creating a high risk that
an informant will be murdered.
Another difference between the military and civilian systems of
justice is the form of legal aid for suspects who do not retain private
attorneys.  There is no public defender system for security suspects
or defendants charged in the military courts.  The military de-
fender system provides legal defense only for soldiers charged with
military offenses.  Many security suspects and defendants are repre-
sented by private attorneys, paid by family members or by organiza-
tions connected to various Palestinian factions.  Although some of
the suspects and defendants are unrepresented, only in a small
number of cases does the military judge appoint a specific private
bar attorney to serve as defense counsel.
We have observed proceedings in these courts.  While military
judges and prosecutors appear well-trained and astute, the defense
attorneys seem inadequately trained for the task.  Many of the attor-
neys representing security suspects and defendants in military
courts are Palestinians who have studied law in neighboring Arab
countries, making them generally less familiar with important nu-
ances of Israeli law.  Some are Arab or Jewish attorneys trained in
Israel.  With several notable exceptions, the level of defense legal
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practice in these courts is not high.  To date, there has been no
organized attempt to rectify the weak nature of legal aid for security
suspects in the military courts.  Attorneys working in these courts
are severely underpaid and are often distracted by their own
problems of survival in the Occupied Territories.  They can be inac-
cessible due to the complicated problems associated with travel in
the Occupied Territories or with gaining physical access to military
court compounds.  The problem of representing Palestinian defen-
dants in the military courts, which was not addressed by the legisla-
ture in creating the OPD, remains a serious impediment to
providing due process in that forum.
C. Representation by Public Defenders of Palestinians Charged
with Terrorist Offenses
Since its creation in 1996, the OPD has represented Palestini-
ans charged with terrorist crimes.  Some of these defendants have
been charged with participation in suicide bombings that resulted
in massive civilian casualties.  Some of these cases have gone to trial;
others have ended in plea agreements.  In our view, the public de-
fenders handling these cases have provided effective legal defense.
The public defenders have generally managed to establish relations
of trust with Palestinian clients charged with security offenses, and
have invested very substantial efforts in providing high quality legal
representation.  The following cases illustrate the OPD’s approach.
In 2002, the OPD represented four residents of Silwan, a
neighborhood in the eastern part of Jerusalem.32  The four Pales-
tinians were charged with murdering a large number of Israeli civil-
ians in a string of attacks.  The attacks included the bombings in a
cafeteria at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, in a nightclub in
the town of Rishon Letzion, and in a cafe in the center of Jerusa-
lem. The four suspects claimed responsibility for all of the attacks
attributed to them.  They each gave full written confessions and
videotaped explanations of the details of each attack.  At the bail
hearings, they spoke with pride in open court about their actions,
not expressing any remorse for the loss of civilian lives.
The members of the Silwan Hamas cell were indicted in the
District Court of Jerusalem for a wide range of offenses, including
32. See C.C. (Jerusalem) 5071/02, State of Israel v. Kassem (unpublished).
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twenty-six counts of murder.  The OPD office in Jerusalem assigned
the case to Abed Assli, a prominent Palestinian attorney with exten-
sive experience in defending Palestinians in the military courts of
the West Bank. Assli’s reputation within the Palestinian community
as an effective advocate for defendants charged in the military
courts of the West Bank enabled him to foster a strong attorney-
client relationship with the defendants.  Although the State of
Israel funded the defense, the defendants had no difficulty in ac-
cepting the representation of this public defender.  The indictment
resulted in a plea agreement.
It is noteworthy that the OPD was able to appoint as a depu-
tized public defender, a Palestinian attorney who had a track record
of representing Palestinian defendants in Israeli courts.  It is likely
that in this case a Jewish or Israeli attorney would not have been
able to establish rapport with the defendants or render effective
assistance of counsel.  This case highlights the value of flexibility in
appointing attorneys that is characteristic of the system of legal aid
institutionalized in the Israeli Public Defender Law.  In a time of
intense social and political conflict, this flexibility appears to be cru-
cial for the effective administration of public defense.
Another case handled by OPD involved the bombing of the
Dolphinarium discoteque in Tel Aviv in June, 2001.  The defendant
in the case was Mahmoud Nadi,33 a Palestinian from the town of
Kalkilya, who transported the suicide bomber from the West Bank
to Tel Aviv.  Certain basic facts are undisputed.  The defendant
picked up the suicide bomber in the West Bank town of Kalkilya.
The suicide bomber was wearing an orthopedic belt packed with
explosives.  The explosives were lined with nails and screws, de-
signed to intensify the lethal effects of the explosion.  The defen-
dant transported the suicide bomber to the seaside promenade in
Tel Aviv, where hundreds of teenagers were waiting to enter a dis-
coteque.  The suicide bomber walked into the middle of the crowd
and detonated the bomb, killing himself and twenty-one teenagers.
Most of the deceased were Jewish immigrants from the former So-
viet Union.
The key question in this case was whether the defendant knew
he was transporting a suicide bomber.  The prosecution had stipu-
33. See C.C. (Tel Aviv) 1121/01, State of Israel v. Naddi (unpublished).
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lated that the defendant was initially unaware that his passenger was
a suicide bomber.  But, the prosecution also insisted that during the
fifty-minute trip from Kalkilya to Tel Aviv, the defendant gradually
realized that he was transporting a suicide bomber.  Relying on this
factual assumption, the prosecution charged the defendant as an
accomplice to the murder of twenty-one individuals.  The defen-
dant adamantly denied these charges, insisting he was unaware of
the suicide bomber’s intentions.  He claimed that he believed that
his passenger was either a car thief or an illegal worker.
The Chief Public Defender in the Tel Aviv District assigned two
Jewish defense attorneys to handle the case, Leah Tzemel and Ronit
Robinson.  Tzemel, who speaks Arabic fluently, is a well-known pri-
vate defense attorney and advocate of Palestinian rights, with exten-
sive experience representing Palestinians defendants both in the
military and civilian courts.  Robinson, a permanent staff attorney
of the OPD, also has substantial experience representing clients
charged with terrorist offenses.  The two defense attorneys reported
that they created an excellent working relationship with each other
and with their client.
The prosecution’s case was based upon circumstantial evidence
regarding the defendant’s state of mind during the ride to Tel Aviv,
and a series of confused and allegedly self-incriminating statements
that the defendant gave to investigators shortly after he was ar-
rested.  The prosecutors pointed out that the suicide bomber was
wearing a bulging shirt and had acted suspiciously during the trip.
They argued that the defendant must have known that he was trans-
porting a suicide bomber, or alternatively, should be deemed culpa-
ble under the doctrine of willful blindness.  During the trial, the
defense produced its own circumstantial evidence to demonstrate
the defendant’s innocence, including the presence of the defen-
dant’s daughter in the car, a risk the defendant would not have
taken had he known he was transporting a suicide bomber.  The
defense also presented expert testimony regarding the defendant’s
psychological makeup and cognitive abilities.  The defense attor-
neys argued that this evidence tended to show that the defendant
could not have had the requisite mens rea.
Despite the vigorous defense presented at trial, the defendant
was convicted of aiding and abetting murder on all the numerous
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counts of the indictment.  At the sentencing stage, the three-judge
panel imposed a prison term of fourteen years, including the time
spent in detention during the trial.  One of the judges on the panel
recommended a sentence of twelve years in prison.  The defense
has appealed the verdict and the sentence.
The Dolphinarium case is different from the Silwan case in two
important respects.  First, the defense attorneys were Jewish, and
one of them was a permanent staff member of OPD.  Second, the
Dolphinarium case went to trial.  These differences exemplify the
wide variations in attorney-client relationships and case histories
that characterize the OPD’s involvement with Palestinian defen-
dants.  The Silwan case illustrates the importance of flexibility in
the appointment of counsel in achieving client loyalty and effective
assistance.  The Dolphinarium case exemplifies two additional vir-
tues of the institutionalized public defense system in the context of
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: the willingness of the state to pro-
vide substantial resources for an effective defense when the case so
requires; and the capacity of Jewish-Israeli attorneys, committed to
professionalism and sensitive to their client’s needs, to create an
effective attorney-client relationship with Palestinian defendants.
III. THE PROSECUTION OF MARWAN BARGHOUTI
In the Barghouti case, the OPD had to decide how to respond
to a court order to defend a client who refused representation.
This was the first time such a dilemma arose for the OPD.34  When
brought to trial in the District Court of Tel-Aviv, Marwan Barghouti
not only refused to be represented by counsel, but also denied the
Court’s authority to conduct a criminal case against him.  This case
was important because it posed a serious threat to the Israeli Public
Defender’s self-definition as a purely professional and non-political
agency for legal services.  In order to understand the Israeli court’s
handling of the matter, it is necessary to look at two principles of
criminal procedure the Israeli Supreme Court announced long
before Barghouti was brought to trial.
34. See C.C. (Tel Aviv) 1158/02, State of Israel v. Barghouti (unpublished).
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A. Right to Self Representation
The Supreme Court of Israel addressed the question of
whether a defendant has a right to self-representation in a case in
which the law required mandatory appointment of defense counsel.
Zion Amiel had been tried and convicted in the District Court of
Jerusalem.35  During his trial, Amiel was not represented by defense
counsel, in spite of the fact that he had been charged with a crime
carrying a maximum penalty of more than ten years of imprison-
ment.  The Court had attempted to appoint a private bar attorney
from the small pool of private defense attorneys who were then will-
ing to accept court appointments during the pre-OPD era, but
Amiel insisted on representing himself.
When asked why he didn’t want a court-appointed attorney,
Amiel explained, “court-appointed attorneys often mess up the
case.”36  The Court accepted Amiel’s request and allowed him to
proceed pro se.  Amiel conducted his own defense vigorously, mak-
ing objections, cross-examining witnesses, and putting defense wit-
nesses on the stand.  Nevertheless, at the end of the lengthy trial he
was convicted.
Amiel retained counsel to file an appeal.  In the appeal, his
defense attorney argued that the trial court erred in allowing Amiel
to conduct his own defense.  The prosecution claimed that a Court
should not impose a defense attorney upon a defendant who insists
on representing himself at trial.  Amiel’s appeal was denied.  The
Supreme Court ruled that the trial court must appoint counsel
when there is a mandatory rule of representation, but held further
that if a defendant does not want a court-appointed attorney and
refuses to cooperate with the attorney actually appointed and
funded by the state, the trial court may allow the defendant to re-
present himself.  The Court emphasized  that the defendant at trial
had taken real steps to defend himself; this was not a case where the
defendant refused appointment of counsel and then failed to put
on any defense whatsoever.
35. C.A. 307/72, Amiel v. the State of Israel, 28(1) P.D. 28, 622 (Hebrew).
36. Id. at 628.  When the Court asked Amiel why he would not accept a court-
appointed attorney, he responded, “I don’t need an attorney.  I don’t need an attorney
for my defense.  If I need one, I will appoint an attorney with my own money.  I don’t
want the court to appoint an attorney for me.” Id.
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B. Appointment of Counsel without Client’s Consent and Cooperation
Twenty-five years after Zion Amiel’s case was adjudicated and
five years before Bharghouti’s case came to trial, the Supreme
Court of Israel addressed the question of whether a trial court can
compel defense counsel to represent a client who has not formally
consented to representation.  In the case of Eyal Buskila,37 a trial
court had directed the OPD to represent a defendant whose where-
abouts were unknown, making it impossible for the public defender
to obtain the defendant’s agreement to representation or carry out
any pretrial consultation.  According to the writ of indictment, Bus-
kilia had participated in a violent crime committed against a for-
eign worker from Romania.  It was alleged that he and an
accomplice had assaulted the foreign worker and taken his wallet.
At the time the indictment was filed, the foreign worker needed to
return to Romania and it was unlikely that he could subsequently
travel back to Israel to testify against Buskila and his co-defendant.
Consequently, the prosecution invoked the “early hearing rule,” a
special procedure for the preservation of testimonial evidence.38
This procedure allows the court to hear the testimony of a witness
before the beginning of the trial itself, even if the defendant cannot
be located.
Although Buskila’s alleged accomplice was present and repre-
sented by a private bar attorney at this special hearing, Buskila was
not present.  The police explained that Buskila had apparently
gone underground and was therefore unlikely to be located
quickly.  In order to give the foreign worker’s testimony more credi-
bility and potentially greater weight with the trial judge when the
full trial commenced, the prosecutor asked the court to appoint a
public defender as defense counsel for Buskila.  The public de-
fender was to participate in the special hearing and cross-examine
the foreign worker, thereby undercutting the likely defense argu-
ment at trial that the testimony should be disregarded or dis-
counted due to the absence of cross examination and argument by
defense counsel at the early hearing.
37. C.A. 5628/97, State of Israel v. Public Defense Organization, Dinim Elyon 52,
817(Hebrew).
38. See Law of Criminal Procedure [Consolidated Version], 1982, §117, 36 L.S.I.
35 (1981-82).
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In its initial decision, the trial court asked the OPD to provide
counsel for Buskila. After assessing the implications of this type of
appointment, the District Public Defender of Tel Aviv asked to be
dismissed from the case.  Her position was that a public defender
could not represent a client who was unavailable to consent to rep-
resentation and unavailable to discuss the nature of the legal ser-
vice contemplated.  The OPD stated that compelled representation
violated the fundamental principle that an attorney is a client’s
agent, and that no such agency could be established without the
express consent of the client.  The OPD also argued that represen-
tation of the defendant at the early hearing, without consulting the
client about his version of the facts, might damage his interests in
the long run, thus violating the OPD’s ethical loyalty to its clients.
The OPD further argued that representing Buskila under these cir-
cumstances would serve primarily to strengthen the prosecution’s
evidence against him by enhancing the evidentiary weight that
would be attributed to the testimony of the prosecution’s primary
witness.  It appeared likely that representation of Buskila by the
OPD would damage the client’s interests and increase his chances
of being convicted.  For all the above reasons, the OPD challenged
the appointment of counsel and asked to be discharged from the
case.
The OPD’s arguments against compelled representation were
accepted by the trial court, but rejected by the Supreme Court.  In a
unanimous decision by a panel of three Justices, the Supreme
Court decided that the OPD was obligated to represent Buskila.  Al-
though the Supreme Court recognized the difficulty of represent-
ing a client in these circumstances, it concluded that the
appointment of defense counsel was necessary for safeguarding the
defendant’s rights and facilitating the adversarial process of justice.
Non-consensual representation in these difficult circumstances, ac-
cording to the Court, was better than no representation at all.  Dis-
counting the possibility that the representation was not in the best
interests of the defendant at this proceeding, the Supreme Court
transformed the Public Defender into a servant of the public good.
The OPD was expected to facilitate a trial procedure that was incon-
sistent with the defendant’s apparent interest and that could not be
conducted without the cooperation of the OPD.  The OPD viewed
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this decision as a defeat for its view that the public defender was
bound by the same codes of effective representation as a private
defense attorney.  Here, the asymmetry was obvious: A private de-
fense attorney could never be compelled to represent an unavaila-
ble and non-consenting client.
C. The Barghouti Trial
In the spring of 2002, the Israeli army launched a massive mili-
tary operation in the West Bank.  The operation followed a series of
lethal attacks by Palestinian militants against the civilian population
of Israel, including an attack on a hotel in the coastal city of
Netanya, during which thirty guests were killed while participating
in a traditional Passover Seder.  A suicide bomber entered the din-
ing room of the hotel and detonated a bomb attached to his body.
Immediately following the attack in Netanya, the Israeli army
mobilized reserve units and sent tanks and armored personnel car-
riers into the cities and towns controlled by the Palestinian Author-
ity in the West Bank.  Hundreds of Palestinians were injured and
killed, and thousands of Palestinians were arrested in these incur-
sions.  None of the arrests were more significant than that of
Marwan Barghouti, a charismatic figure regarded by many Palestin-
ian Arabs as a potential successor to Yassir Arafat.  At the time of his
arrest, Barghouti served as the Secretary General of the Fatah move-
ment and was a member of the elected Palestinian legislature.
Barghouti’s arrest was based on allegations that he served as
the head of a miltary organization responsible for a series of lethal
attacks against Israeli military and civilian targets.  In August of
2002, the State Attorney’s Office filed a detailed indictment charg-
ing Barghouti as both a principal and accessory in a series of
crimes, including murder, attempted murder, incitement to mur-
der, facilitation of murder, conspiracy to commit a crime, member-
ship in a terrorist organization, and participation in activities of a
terrorist organization.  The indictment was unusual because the de-
fendant was not charged with direct participation in any violent
crime.  Rather, Barghouti was indicted for his role as the leader of
three “terrorist organizations:” the “Fatah,” the “Tanzim,” and “Al
Aksa Brigades.”  These organizations had publicly claimed responsi-
bility for a series of attacks that had taken place between December,
18178_nlr_48-1-2 Sheet No. 61 Side B      04/27/2004   12:08:32
18178_nlr_48-1-2 Sheet No. 61 Side B      04/27/2004   12:08:32
C M
Y K
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\48-1-2\NLR214.txt unknown Seq: 26 16-APR-04 9:30
116 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
2000 and April, 2002.  The attacks caused the death of twenty-six
persons, including twenty-two civilians and four members of the Is-
raeli police forces.  The attacks outlined in the indictment took
place both in the occupied West Bank and within the pre-1967
boundaries of the State of Israel.39 According to the indictment,
Barghouti also made public statements that incited his followers to
commit murder.
Upon filing the indictment, the prosecution petitioned the
court to detain Barghouti in custody for the duration of the crimi-
nal proceedings.  Barghouti opposed this motion and asked to be
released on bail.  At the bail hearing, Barghouti was represented by
a team of private defense attorneys, headed by Jouwad Boulous, a
prominent attorney from the Palestinian Arab community with ex-
tensive experience in representing defendants charged with terror-
ist crimes.  Barghouti’s defense attorneys argued at the bail hearing
that the indictment should be dismissed because the State of Israel
had no authority to bring criminal charges against an elected Pales-
tinian official.  They also claimed that the indictment was a viola-
tion of the Oslo Peace Accords,40 signed by representatives of the
State of Israel and the Palestinian Authority.  These arguments were
rejected by the District Court.  Barghouti was remanded to custody
for the duration of his trial.  The formal arraignment procedure,
which Israeli law defines as the official commencement of a crimi-
nal trial, was scheduled for September, 2002.  The trial was assigned
39. One of the attacks outlined in the indictment occurred in a wedding hall in
the Israeli town of Hadera.  Six guests at the wedding were gunned down while sitting
next to the dance floor.  Another attack was launched in a crowded seafood restaurant
in Tel Aviv.  (Customers eating dinner were attacked by a gunman, who used an auto-
matic assault rifle, and also lobbed hand grenades into the restaurant.)  In one of the
attacks, a sniper, who mistook the bearded Priest for an Orthodox Jewish settler, killed
a Greek Orthodox Priest driving his car on the West Bank.  In another attack, a woman
sitting in her car at a gas station was gunned down in the presence of her baby son, after
the attacker ascertained that she was Jewish.
40. Barghouti’s attorneys argued that, in accordance with the Interim Israeli-Pales-
tinian accord regarding the West Bank and Gaza, the State of Israel had granted exclu-
sive jurisdiction to Palestinian National Council regarding the prosecution of criminal
acts committed in the West Bank.  This argument was rejected by the District Court of
Tel Aviv in a detailed decision, which cited various clauses of Israeli domestic law and
the Israeli-Palestinian accords, which sustain and affirm Israel’s authority to indict and
try persons who allegedly committed crimes against Israeli citizens on the West Bank
and within the pre-1967 boundaries of Israel.
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to a panel of three experienced judges, headed by Justice Sara
Sirota.
At the arraignment hearing, Barghouti was not represented by
defense counsel.  His private attorneys sent a representative to ob-
serve the proceedings, but the representative insisted that he had
no “power of attorney” to act as Barghouti’s defense attorney at
trial.  The District Court then ordered the OPD to arrange for
Barghouti’s defense, but Barghouti adamantly refused to be repre-
sented by a Public Defender.41
The OPD responded by requesting not to be appointed. It ar-
gued that the Supreme Court’s ruling in the Amiel case held that
when a defendant refused representation and refused to cooperate
with an appointed defense counsel, the defense attorneys should be
41. The dialogue between Barghouti and Justice Sirota, as recorded in the court
protocol, speaks for itself:
Barghouti: “First of all, I want to say clearly, with all due respect, the
Public Defender does not represent me.  I represent myself, and there is a
mistake here.  It is not me that should be sitting on the defendant’s chair,
but the State of Israel.
I do not recognize this Court.  This Court represents the occupiers.
This is the Court of the occupiers.  This is not a personal matter.”
Justice Sirota:  “Do you want to be represented by counsel?
Barghouti:  I said no.”
Justice Sirota:  “In my opinion, you need an attorney.  And I am obli-
gated, and in accordance with the law, to explain this to you.”
Barghouti:  “This is unacceptable.  I decide, not you.”
Sirota:  “The law states that we have to read the indictment to the de-
fendant, and if he has any objections, like the preliminary objections you
have raised about the authority of the court, the defendant should raise the
objections after we read the document of indictment.  Now, if you have an
attorney, then he can read the indictment, and it saves time.  But, since you
don’t have an attorney, I am obligated to read the indictment to you.”
Barghouti:  “I don’t want to hear the indictment.”
Sirota:  “Sir, you don’t have a choice.  If you had an attorney, you
wouldn’t have to listen to the reading of the indictment. . . Excuse me,
there is an attorney here from the office of Advocate Boulous, who repre-
sented you at the bail hearing.  He certainly read the document of indict-
ment to you.”
Barghouti:  “No, no, I didn’t see the indictment, and I will not relate to
the indictment at all.  I won’t relate to it at all.  The indictment does not
interest me.  This is an indictment of an occupying government.”
Sirota:  “All right, but you have to hear.  I could spare you this if you
had an attorney.  The law says. . .”
Barghouti:  “I don’t have an attorney.  He does not represent me.  No-
body, I represent myself.”
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released.  The OPD senior staff also believed that it would be uneth-
ical to represent Barghouti, given his lack of consent and unwilling-
ness to discuss the case.  The OPD emphasized that adversarial
representation of Barghouti would undermine the defense strategy
chosen by the defendant.  The District Court, however, believed
that the Buskila precedent, in which the Supreme had required the
OPD to represent a client it never met, rather than that of Amiel,
governed the Barghouti case and refused to dismiss the OPD.  The
District Public Defender of Tel Aviv was ordered to meet with
Barghouti and to try to arrange for his representation.  Thereafter,
the District Public Defender made a series of attempts to locate
counsel that Barghouti would find acceptable.  Although some of
the most experienced private-bar attorneys in Israel expressed their
desire to defend Barghouti on behalf of the OPD, Barghouti po-
litely turned down all of these offers.  He also refused to accept the
assistance of the most experienced defense attorneys on the OPD’s
staff.
Barghouti made no secret of the reasoning behind his posi-
tion. He stressed that his decision to forego any trial defense was
adopted after careful consultation with his privately retained attor-
neys.  He emphasized that he held no personal resentment against
the public defenders who were prepared to assist him.  Neverthe-
less, he explained that he regarded the OPD as an extension of the
occupying powers of the State of Israel.  It would be impossible for
him to accept any kind of representation from the OPD.  Barghouti
demanded that no public defender should speak in his name in
court or try to mount a defense in his behalf.
In light of Barghouti’s position, the OPD re-petitioned the Dis-
trict Court and asked to be dismissed from the case.  The District
Court denied the request and ordered the OPD not only to re-
present Barghouti, but also to “mount a vigorous defense of the
defendant.”  Over the District Public Defender’s protests, the Court
insisted nonetheless that the OPD must represent Barghouti like
any other client, making legal arguments on his behalf and cross-
examining the prosecution’s witnesses.  Underlying the Court’s de-
cision was the assumption that an adversarial system of justice can-
not function properly if the defendant does not offer a defense.  In
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the interests of due process and justice, the Court held that a crimi-
nal defendant must be defended at trial, regardless of his wishes.
D. Resolving the Dilemma of Compelled Representation
The OPD now faced a serious dilemma.  How could a defense
attorney represent a client who would not talk about the indict-
ment?  May a defense attorney ignore the explicit request of a men-
tally competent client who asks the attorney not to cross-examine
the prosecution’s witnesses?  Does a criminal defendant’s right to
challenge the court’s authority imply a right to refuse to be repre-
sented by counsel at trial?  Does the public defender’s role in the
administration of justice include the representation of defendants
who refuse to be represented?
Under the applicable ethics rules, it is unclear whether an at-
torney may represent a mentally competent defendant who refuses
to be assisted by counsel.  The Israeli Bar Association’s ethical rules
stipulate that “in fulfilling his role, an attorney shall act for the ben-
efit of his client with loyalty and dedication, and shall assist the
court in administration of justice.”42  This rule expresses the classic
tension between the attorney’s loyalty to the client on the one
hand, and his role as an officer of the court on the other.  Relying
on this rule, one could argue that a public defender is ethically
bound to assist the court in “doing justice,” thereby protecting the
defendant from a possible false conviction, even when a recalcitrant
defendant wishes not to be represented.  But the OPD was reluctant
to accept this view because it lent too much weight to the defense
attorney’s role as an officer of the court and undervalued the de-
fense attorney’s loyalty to the client and the defendant’s right to
control his defense at trial.
Beyond questions of law and ethics, there was a powerful politi-
cal subtext underlying the issue of representing Barghouti at trial.
Marwan Barghouti was unwilling to accede to the rules of the game
that the State of Israel was imposing on him.  He did not want to
accept the role of a criminal defendant.  Barghouti preferred to
concentrate his efforts on undermining the very legitimacy of the
criminal proceeding initiated against him.  He wanted to portray
himself as a political prisoner and a martyr, unjustly prosecuted by
42. Rule 54 of the Chambers of Advocates Law (Professional Ethics), 1986.
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an immoral legal system.  He did not want his trial to look like a fair
proceeding.
Barghouti’s decision to forego the assistance of counsel was an-
ything but irrational.  In the absence of counsel, Barghouti could
speak directly to the court, in front of an audience of media repre-
sentatives from around the world.  The absence of counsel would
underscore Barghouti’s defiance and his posture as an underdog.
It would also make it difficult for the State of Israel to portray
Barghouti as an alleged criminal who was receiving a fair trial.
Given this defense position, representation by the OPD would un-
dercut Barghouti’s interests, as he perceived them.
One can further argue that Barghouti’s decision not to defend
himself at trial was the most intelligent decision he could make
under the circumstances.  While Barghouti’s trial was taking place,
the Government of Israel was engaged in discussions with the Pales-
tinian Authority about the implementation of an internationally
brokered peace initiative known as “the road map to peace.”  It was
widely assumed that the implementation of this peace initiative
would include the release of Palestinian prisoners from Israeli pris-
ons.  In this context, Barghouti could hope to be released, if the
international community would apply sufficient pressure on the Is-
raeli Government.  It would be more difficult to garner support to
release Barghouti if he were convicted in a full-fledged criminal
trial with due process of law.  The international community would
be more likely to pressure Israel to release Barghouti if he could
portray himself as a political prisoner, prosecuted unfairly in a bo-
gus criminal trial.
Another layer of political and social subtext underlying the di-
lemma of representing Barghouti relates to the OPD’s perception
of its role in Israeli society.  Since its inception, the OPD had em-
phasized its independence from the organs of the state.  Public de-
fenders had sought to establish their credentials as zealous
advocates of individual defendants, enabling them to establish rela-
tions of trust with their clients.  Although the OPD was funded by
the state and some of its attorneys were directly employed by the
state, the individual defense attorneys strove to portray themselves
as independent actors bound by an undivided loyalty to their cli-
ents.  Eventually, this message registered with the relevant segments
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of the Israeli public, Jews and Arabs alike.  The OPD gradually
earned the trust of clients from all sectors of the population, includ-
ing Palestinian Arabs from the West Bank and Gaza.  The Barghouti
case threatened to upset the delicate position of the OPD; repre-
senting Barghouti against his wishes under court order would ap-
pear to be a manifestation of disloyalty to the client and loyalty to
the state.  This would certainly have a deleterious effect on the cov-
enant of professional trust between the public defenders and their
future clients.
Notwithstanding its understanding of Barghouti’s position, the
OPD staff knew that it had to make an effort to comply with the
District Court’s instruction because it was an official court order
and the OPD was a state agency. Thus, the District Public Defender
appointed a team of experienced defense attorneys to represent
Barghouti at trial.  The defense attorneys prepared for trial by stud-
ying all of the voluminous investigative material in the prosecutor’s
file.  They made a concerted effort to be well prepared and poised
for action in court.
But OPD compliance stopped short of actual representation.
The staff attorneys deftly refrained from active participation in the
trial, constantly measuring and assessing the response of the judges
in the courtroom setting.  To the dismay of the judges, the attor-
neys sent by the OPD did not cross-examine the witnesses; nor did
they make any legal arguments on Barghouti’s behalf.  Their inac-
tion did not, however, bring them into open conflict with the court.
Paradoxically, the public defender’s passivity did not stimulate cen-
sure of the attorneys, nor renewed calls for proactive representa-
tion.  Instead, the judges attempted to fill the role of the defense.
Uncharacteristically, they abandoned their attitude of moderate
aloofness toward the parties and adopted a critical, if not suspi-
cious, posture toward the prosecution.  The judges were constantly
interrupting the prosecutor with questions from the bench, openly
expressing their doubts about certain parts of the evidence.
Ultimately, the public defenders’ inaction in court was dictated
by the practical difficulty of defending a client who would not coop-
erate with counsel.  Because criminal defense requires active con-
sultation with the client, genuine cross examination of the
prosecution’s witnesses was impossible.  The prosecution’s case
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against Barghouti was based on transcripts of his interrogation by
the General Security investigators and a wide variety of statements
made by field operatives of the Al-Aksa Martyr’s Brigade, who alleg-
edly acted as Barghouti’s deputies.  The prosecution also intro-
duced documents seized in various Palestinian offices on the West
Bank, as well as taped interviews that Barghouti gave to the news
media.  The OPD believed that a defense attorney could not con-
struct a proper line of defense without hearing the client’s version
of the events described in the indictment or his comments on the
prosecution’s evidence.
In order to mount a proper defense, the defense attorneys
needed the client’s cooperation and participation.  What were the
circumstances surrounding Barghouti’s confession?  What ap-
proach should be used with the testimony of Barghouti’s alleged
accomplices?  Who would constitute good witnesses for the de-
fense?  What documentary evidence should be used to create an
alternative view of events?  It was impossible to build a defense
based on speculation, imagined factual scenarios and fishing expe-
ditions.  To do so would run the risk of strengthening the prosecu-
tion’s case.  The judges seem to have silently acknowledged and
accepted the view that counsel could not mount a proper defense,
and decided to challenge the prosecution’s case on their own.
Despite the client’s wish to remain unrepresented, it could be
argued that the OPD’s passivity was detrimental to the due process
of law.  Barghouti’s refusal to mount a defense undermined the
Court’s ability to conduct a full-fledged trial.  The system of justice
could not function properly without vigorous cross examination
and adversarial legal argument.  This point was dramatically and ex-
plicitly made by Barghouti himself.  After the prosecutor finished
her summation speech, Barghouti declared to the Prosecutor, “You
are lucky that I didn’t conduct a defense, because I would have
shown that your whole case is based on lies.”  Many months later,
the court has not yet given its judgment in the case.
CONCLUSION
The right to publicly funded defense counsel in criminal pro-
ceedings in Israel has always been limited.  In the early 1990s, a
national average of over fifty percent of the defendants went unrep-
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resented at criminal trials.  The creation of the OPD in Israel did
much to change this.  Eligibility for appointed counsel was ex-
panded, the nature of bail hearings before indictment was radically
changed due to the use of “on duty” public defenders and represen-
tation among defendants in the juvenile court increased dramati-
cally.  Most importantly, the quality of defense services rose through
a refined system of attorney selection and active OPD staff supervi-
sion of attorneys. The OPD also greatly expanded the role of Arab
defense attorneys in providing legal services to Palestinians in all
criminal cases, including cases of terrorism and security offenses.
These institutional changes in legal aid meant that Palestinians
could now receive due process in Israeli courts, even in the shadow
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
The OPD had committed itself to a mission of professionaliza-
tion, in which ideology and politics were kept outside of the arena
of legal services.  This did not mean that the Office was blind to the
role of ethnic and national identity in the quest to establish attor-
ney-client confidence and loyalty.  Rather, the OPD appointed Jews
to represent Arabs and Arabs to represent Jews, so long as the com-
mitment to zealous representation in the case of Palestinian defen-
dants was not compromised.  To a large degree, this policy has
worked.  A strong bridge has been created between an institution
funded by the State of Israel and Palestinian clients who find them-
selves swept up into the legal system of a state for which many of
them feel nothing but enmity and disdain. Our observations indi-
cate that a significant degree of trust and reliance can be created in
this climate.  When skilled professionals offer help in a genuine
way, individuals in trouble seem willing to accept it.  Within the en-
clave of confidentiality, public defenders are able to communicate
to Palestinians that their good-faith efforts to act in the best interest
of their clients and their professional values are stronger than attor-
ney-client political or ideological conflicts.  In this important sense,
commitment to professional values among public defenders today
is strong enough to weather the storm of the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict.
The case of Marwan Barghouti posed a threat to the profes-
sional mission of the OPD.  If the OPD had represented Barghouti
against his will, it would have communicated that the OPD has cho-
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sen allegiance to the court over the client’s own perception of his
or her best interest.  While allegiance to a court of law and rejection
of a client’s choice of action is sometimes dictated by the ethics
rules, finding a balance between these competing dictates is prob-
lematic when the court is viewed by the client as an instrument of
state oppression.  In this context, OPD representation of Barghouti
would certainly have damaged the foundations of trust between
public defenders and many Palestinian clients.  On the other hand,
refusing to represent Barghouti would have placed the OPD in di-
rect violation of a court order, which the court believed would fur-
ther due process of the law.  This dilemma was ultimately
sidestepped because both the OPD and the Court acted cautiously
and with deference to the complexity of the situation.  While the
OPD accepted the court’s order, the public defenders present in
court continued to explain that the circumstances made it impracti-
cal to cross examine witnesses or make procedural arguments.
While the court stood behind its order as a formal statement of
procedural law, it did not insist that the public defenders comply
with it.  The court and the OPD silently negotiated a standoff.  The
principle that the OPD had an obligation to represent a recalcitrant
client was preserved, while the practical impossibility of actually
presenting a defense received informal acknowledgment.
Although the OPD arrived at a solution in the Barghouti mat-
ter, the possibility of the same situation arising in the future with
greater frequency is troubling.  If more Palestinians refuse repre-
sentation and reject the authority of the courts, public defenders
will progressively become unable to make a contribution to the due
process of law.  This would be a signal that the politics of violence
and hatred had breached a fundamental structure of law and de-
mocracy in Israeli society.  In our view, the best way to avoid this
result is to strengthen the pursuit of highly professional legal repre-
sentation and to bolster due process in criminal proceedings.  As
long as public defenders are perceived by their clients as loyal and
zealous, and the courts remain loyal to fundamental notions of due
process, it will be possible for the law to retain its integrity and au-
thority, even in the extremely difficult circumstances posed by the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
